The term “apposition unit” in 47 U.S.C. . . 47 U.S.C No. 224 (a) (4). Georgia Power justifies this decision by the fact that the definition of “slope” refers to the area “ancillary units” possible in . 224 (e) limit. Georgia Power also notes that another subsection distinguishes entities that receive schedules at one pole and “other entities,” “other entities” including the owner of the pole, i.e. the utility. 47 U.S.C No. 224 (i).
To estimate the average number of units attached, FCC used its expertise and the information it had developed during the settlement process that led to the recon order. This was a perfectly reasonable response given the lack of essential information on the part of the parties. FCC did not simply apply the recon Order`s conjecture to Teleport because the Recon Order had established the rules for resolving such disputes. On the contrary, the justification of the order of recognition was sufficiently persuasive to convince the FCC, in the exercise of its regulatory expertise, that the assumptions established in this regime were the best estimates of the average number of attachments. While the ordinary use of regulation is to adopt binding rules, we do not see anything arbitrary or capricious in relying on the information developed in a regulation as a compelling reason to take a particular course of dissolution of an analog warrant. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228, 121 S.C. 2164, 2172, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (in recognition of knowledge, that administrative prosecutions can “have the power to convince if there is no lack of control” (quote De Skidmore v.
Swift – Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 P.C. 161, 164, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). In the circumstances of this litigation, the invocation of persuasive force of the justification of the recon order was an appropriate exercise of the FCC`s power, the average number of attaches according to . 1.1409, point a). According to Georgia Power, the clear language of the Telecommunications Act requires the parties to negotiate rent rents before filing a complaint with the Commission. 47 U.S.C No.
224 (e) (1) (1) (“The Commission writes. Regulations. to regulate the costs associated with seizures of poles used by telecommunications companies to provide telecommunications services when the parties are unable to resolve a dispute over these charges.” The Fcc`s rules refer in the same way to Commission rates “when the parties are unable to settle a dispute over foreclosure costs.” 47 C.F.R. No 1.1409 (e). On the basis of these rules, Georgia Power argues that, in the absence of actual negotiations between Georgia Power and Teleport, the parties have not yet “failed to resolve the dispute” and that the FCC intervened prematurely in deciding the teleport complaint. In both the first and second petitions, Georgia Power argues that the FCC rate only denies it compensation for the acquisition imposed by the Telecommunications Act. As Georgia Power acknowledges, this issue is now controlled by our recent decision in Alabama Power. In Alabama Power, FCC rejected the price demanded by Alabama Power for stopping the fixing by a wiring company on its electric pylons. Alabama Power has requested a review of the FCC order and argues that the cable tariff imposed by the FCC does not constitute the fair compensation required by the Constitution for the implementation of the Telecommunications Act. See Ala. Power, 311 F.3d 1360-61.